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Abstract
Rising sea levels necessitate careful consideration of different forms of coastal protec-
tion but cost-benefit analysis is limited when important non-market social costs have 
not been measured. Seawalls protect individual properties but can potentially impose 
negative externalities on neighboring properties via accelerated beach loss. We con-
duct a hedonic valuation of seawalls in two coastal California counties: San Diego 
and Santa Cruz. We find no strong evidence to suggest that the presence of a seawall 
is positively correlated with the value of the home protected. However, we find that 
seawalls are strongly negatively correlated with the value of neighboring properties in 
Santa Cruz but not in San Diego county, suggesting that the effect of seawalls depend 
on certain geographical attributes. Our results are robust to accounting for the public-
good nature of locational attributes and the potential spatial dependence of housing 
prices. Simulation reveals that doubling the extent of seawalls in San Diego and Santa 
Cruz could reduce property tax revenues by $7 million and $54 million, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Rising sea levels necessitate careful consideration of the pros and cons of differ-
ent forms of coastal protection. As sea levels rise, pressure to armor the coast, in 
the form of seawalls and other protective structures, will likely grow (Caldwell and 
Segall 2007).1 However, putting up a seawall in front of one’s property is a classic 
example of an action with a negative externality.2 Seawalls protect individual prop-
erties but may impose negative externalities or costs on beachgoers and neighboring 
properties via accelerated beach loss. If such costs are greater than the private ben-
efits, then seawalls might actually reduce social welfare.
How do seawalls cause accelerated beach loss? First and most obviously, seawalls 
cause placement loss or the unavailability of the physical area beneath the actual 
seawall. Second, seawalls restrict the sediment and sand eroding down bluffs that 
would otherwise replenish and grow beaches. This is known as impoundment loss. 
Third, they magnify the power of retreating waves, carrying sand out to sea. These 
outgoing reflected waves strike the sea floor on each outgoing surge, creating a 
steeper undersea slope.3 These steeper slopes then preclude the ability of incom-
ing waves to bring new sand to replenish an already eroded beach. Water in front 
of the seawalls becomes deep and the shoreline moves landwards, resulting in mod-
erate loss in beach width. This process, called passive erosion, has been observed 
and studied in different areas (Griggs 2005). Finally, seawalls often cause loss of 
nearby beaches. The new steep undersea slope prevents sand supply moving down 
the coast. As a result, neighboring beaches are starved of sand that would otherwise 
be supplied by shoreline currents (see Griggs and Tait, 1988, and Hall et al., 1990, 
for detailed case studies, and Griggs, 2009, for an accessible overview).
It is well documented that people enjoy going to the beach (Bin et  al. 2005) 
and that wide sandy beaches are highly valued (Pompe and Rinehart 1995; Pompe 
1999; Landry et al. 2003; Landry and Hindsley 2011; Pendleton et al. 2012). Not 
surprisingly, some studies have found that panoramic view of the beach, greater 
beachwidth, and shorter distance to the beach have a positive relationship with 
property valuation (Brown and Pollakowski 1977; Edwards and Gable 1991; Par-
sons and Wu 1991; Parsons and Powell 2001; Bin et  al. 2008a). Some studies 
employ hedonic valuation methods and find that beach width is positively asso-
ciated with property value (Pompe and Rinehart 1995; Landry and Hindsley 
2011). Others estimate the reduction in property values due to higher erosion risk 
(Kriesel et al. 1993; Pompe and Rinehart 1995; Bin et al. 2008b; Pompe 2008). 
Because beach proximity and erosion risk are so highly correlated, separate 
identification within a hedonic framework is potentially challenging. In a major 
1 A number of studies reveal that rising sea levels may further expose more properties, facilities, and 
people to erosion and other physical hazards, thus putting a pressure on their ability to cope with related 
disasters and to respond to them (Wu et al. 2002).
2 We define a seawall as a vertical or near-vertical shore-parallel structure designed to prevent erosion 
and storm surge flooding.
3 Figure A.1 in the appendix illustrates how coastal armoring accelerates beachloss.
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contribution to the literature, Bin et  al. (2008a) construct a three-dimensional 
measure of ocean view that varies independent of erosion risk to separately iden-
tify these effects. They find that a greater ocean view significantly increases prop-
erty value and flood risk significantly lowers property value. In a similar contri-
bution, Gopalakrishnan et al. (2011) correct for potential endogeneity in hedonic 
models using distance to the continental shelf as instrumental variables to esti-
mate the effect of beachwidth on property values. They find that beach width con-
tributes significantly more to property values than previously believed, with the 
coefficient of beach width being nearly five times as large as the OLS estimate.
Despite this vast literature documenting the hedonic value of beach width 
and reduced erosion risk, it remains unclear whether seawalls themselves have 
a net negative or positive impact on social welfare. There are currently only two 
hedonic studies on the negative external cost of seawalls and/or other forms of 
coastal armoring. In the first, Kriesel and Friedman (2002, 2003) find that coastal 
armoring appears to lower property values a few rows inland. They find a nega-
tive and statistically significant correlation between property prices in the South-
east US and the degree of coastal armoring on nearby beaches. However, water-
front homes protected by a seawall tend to have higher values than waterfront 
properties that are unprotected. In the second study, Landry et al. (2003) conduct 
both a hedonic and a contingent valuation study of coastal armoring. They find 
a negative but statistically insignificant correlation between property prices on 
Tybee Island, Georgia, and a visible erosion structure at the nearest shore. Their 
contingent valuation study confirms that recreational beach visitors have a higher 
willingness to pay to visit beaches with minimal shoreline armoring (approxi-
mately 25% higher). Thus, the literature to date strongly suggests that people who 
value beaches do not like beaches with seawalls but there is not an overwhelming 
amount of evidence that seawalls are correlated with lower property values.
Our goal in this paper is to test whether the presence of a seawall is correlated 
with higher or lower property values in coastal areas, holding all other determi-
nants of value constant. Our paper is complementary to Kriesel and Friedman 
(2002, 2003) in that we use a very similar approach and data source, however, we 
use a different subset of the data from a different geographical location: Califor-
nia. In particular, we take data from San Diego and Santa Cruz counties, which 
offers variation in terms of the extent of spatial dependence in housing prices and 
differences in the  valuation of beach and coastal armoring arising from differ-
ences in certain geographical attributes, such as altitude and distance to the water.
In addition, we make a minor methodological improvement over the work of 
Kriesel and Friedman (2002, 2003) by estimating our model while testing and 
accounting for potential spatial dependence in the estimation procedure and the 
public good nature of locational attributes. Our work thus serves as both a rep-
lication test and an extension of their earlier findings. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and the details 
of our empirical analysis. Sect.  3 presents the results and Sect.  4 discusses the 
implications of our findings.
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2  Conceptual framework
2.1  Hedonic valuation of seawalls
There are various factors that determine house values in coastal areas:
where P is the price of a house i, S are structural attributes (such as bedrooms, 
square footage, lot size, etc), L are locational attributes (e.g. distance to the water), 
C is the degree of coastal armoring on the nearest beach to the property (i.e. % of 
waterfront homes with seawalls) and A is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if 
the property is waterfront and protected by a seawall.
Suppose the value for property i is expressed as a linear function of each property 
attribute such that:
where  and  are coefficients on the structural and locational attributes respectively, 
1 and 2 are our coefficient of interest. If two houses, r and s are identical in S and 
L then:
is an empirically valid measure of the value of coastal armoring on residential prop-
erties. This value could be negative or positive, depending on the relative size of the 
private value to waterfront property owners who built seawalls and the impact of 
seawall protection of other houses in their locality.
2.2  Data
The data employed to perform our analyses are from field measurement and mail 
survey information collected by the H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Econom-
ics and the Environment in 1999.4 The Heinz Center published a report in 2000 
entitled “Evaluation of Erosion Hazards” (Center 2000). This report was mandated 
under the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, and involved a large team 
of collaborators whose goal was to assess coastal erosion and the resulting loss of 
property along the ocean and Great Lakes shorelines of the United States. There 
were many different components to this project but one element involved collecting 
data on the presence of seawalls and on property prices in coastal communities.
The data on seawalls and erosion risk was collected as follows. Field survey teams 
were deployed by the Heinz Center to measure and photograph 11,450 different 
(1)Pi = f (Si, Li,Ci,Ai),
(2)Pi =
Ns∑
j=1
jSji +
NL∑
l=1
lLli + 1Ci + 2Ai,
(3)Pr − Ps = i(Cr − Cs) + 2(Ar − As),
4 The dataset is a result of a study commissioned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). No follow-up study assessments or household surveys were conducted after this study.
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structures in 18 coastal counties. The total number of ‘surveyed’ structures in San 
Diego was 997 and 746 in Santa Cruz. The entire data set covers approximately 3% 
of the structures located within 1,000 feet of the shoreline along the Atlantic coast, 
Gulf of Mexico, Pacific coast, and the Great Lakes. The dataset was supplemented 
by other data from county assessor offices, particularly information on the surveyed 
structures. This was then supplemented with information from detailed question-
naires mailed to the owners of properties within 500 ft of the shoreline within the 
18 coastal counties. The Heinz Center research team combined all of this informa-
tion to calculate the presence and extent of seawalls and beach nourishment projects 
within the 18 counties. The Heinz Center research team also collected data in the 
field on the reference elevation of each structure, beach width, and on the distance to 
an Erosion Reference Feature, typically the top edge of a bluff, dune, vegetation line 
or beach. This was done by a three-person team using GPS receivers. A complete 
list of variables and their description is provided in A.6.
The data on property prices and property characteristics was collected from the 
detailed questionnaire mentioned above.5 This mail survey of coastal homeowners 
was conducted by the Heinz Center, in collaboration with the University of Geor-
gia. In addition to questions regarding the presence of seawalls on local beaches, 
property owners were asked to report the purchase price of their home, the date pur-
chased, and basic information about the property (number of bedrooms, square foot-
age, etc.). This data was cross-referenced with data on property characteristics col-
lected from county assessor and courthouse records.
The Heinz Center study is one of only a few detailed surveys of seawall locations 
in the US and is a unique resource for evaluating their impacts. Of the 18 counties 
studied in the original report, two are in California: San Diego and Santa Cruz coun-
ties. In this paper, we focus on the two California counties because previous research 
using the same dataset centered on the East coast of the US and a California-spe-
cific analysis may be useful for informing policy discussions in the state regarding 
responses to sea level rise and other coastal hazards.
2.3  Hedonic pricing model
In terms of implementation, we apply a log–log hedonic pricing model6:
where Xn are all continuous independent variables (including the share of armored 
properties), Dk represent dummy variables (including an indicator variable that turns 
(4)ln(Property Price) = pi = 0 +
N∑
n=1
nlnXn +
K∑
k=1
kDk + ,
5 Ideally, property prices should be based on actual sales price. Without access to actual sales data, 
homeowner estimates of value can serve as reasonably good approximations (Taylor 2003).
6 We are particularly concerned with the elasticities or percent changes in prices as a result of coastal 
armoring. This makes the logarithmic form more appropriate. We are also keen on eliminating the effect 
of outliers to drive our results, which level regressions are more susceptible to.
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to unity when the property is armored) and all other terms are as previously defined. 
We estimate Eq.  (4) for the two counties (separately and combined) using simple 
ordinary least squares. Later on, we relax the assumptions of this method by (1) 
weighting locational attributes by lot size as proposed by Parsons (1990) to account 
for the public-good nature of locational attributes and (2) considering potential spa-
tial dependence in housing prices (Cliff and Ord 1970; Can 1990).
It is expected that the seven structural characteristics variables, except the two 
temporal indicators, should have a positive influence on house prices. Age of house 
(Years Since Built) can capture the annual deterioration of the physical property and 
therefore should have a negative effect on house price. Due to price appreciation 
over this time period, recently sold houses should have higher prices than houses 
sold a few years ago, so we expect a negative sign on Years Since Last Transaction.
Other variables describe the environmental quality and risk of the structure. 
Coastal armoring projects (such as seawalls, rip-rap, groins, and breakwaters) are 
typically installed with the objective to protect properties from erosion damage. 
Therefore, the Seawall variable is expected to have a positive coefficient in the 
regression model. For non-waterfront homes, erosion risk is usually not a consid-
eration of the owners. Instead of benefiting from armoring projects, they are likely 
to worry more about the degradation of beach amenities from seawalls. For unpro-
tected non-waterfront homes, reduced lateral access to shoreline due to coastal 
armoring can lower their property values (Griggs 2009). This effect is captured by 
the variable Percent Seawalls, defined as the percent of waterfront structures within 
a beach community7 that reported the presence of shoreline stabilization structures 
such as seawalls and rip-rap. This is our primary variable of interest and we expect 
the associated coefficient to be negative. This variable was calculated by dividing 
the sum of Seawall by the sum of Waterfront within each of the fifteen beach com-
munities in our sample.8
Another shoreline protection option, beach nourishment, could also reduce ero-
sion risk to coastal properties while maintaining some beach amenities. The two 
variables Waterfront Nourishment and Beach Nourishment are expected to have pos-
itive correlations with property prices. Respondents reporting beach nourishment 
only account for a small percentage of the California sample (9%). Thus, we observe 
no variation in this variable for the vast majority of houses in our sample. We there-
fore report results including and excluding those respondents who answered ques-
tions relating to beach nourishment.
Elevation refers to the height that the first floor of a home is elevated above the 
base flood elevation level. The higher the elevation of the house, the better the phys-
ical flood protection. Geotime is a measure of erosion risk defined as the number 
of years until the distance between the property and the erosion reference feature 
7 Our dataset contains nine San Diego beach communities and six Santa Cruz beach communities, with 
the largest community having 50 property records. A beach community is defined as all of the buildings 
located within 1,000 feet of the shoreline.
8 Ideally, the measure of the extent of seawalled coastline should be the total length of seawalls divided 
by the total length of the coastline in a particular beach community. However, our dataset does not con-
tain the length of seawalls making this metric infeasible to calculate.
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(ERF) is reduced to zero. To compute this variable, the erosion rate at each prop-
erty location is calculated first. Since in some areas erosion rates can be determined 
from historical records, while in others they are affected by protection devices such 
as seawalls, we applied the same method used in the Heinz Center’s erosion haz-
ard report. A detailed description of this formulation is presented in Appendix B. A 
squared logarithm of Geotime is added to the model to test for a non-linear effect. 
Built Post-FIRM is an indicator variable for whether or not the home was built post 
the publication of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) for the surrounding area. 
Post-FIRM homes typically have lower insurance premiums if they are built above 
base flood elevation levels, therefore we expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
positive.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all of our main variables. On the average, 
properties in Santa Cruz are generally more expensive compared to those in San 
Diego. This is probably due to bigger houses and lot sizes. Houses in San Diego are 
also situated in higher places and closer to the water, which implies that these houses 
are potentially in high cliffs above water (Griggs and Savoy 1985). The difference in 
Table 1  Summary statistics
Source of basic data: The Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and Management (Center 2000)
San Diego Santa Cruz
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Price (’000, in 2014 
US$)
588.56 412.20 66.15 3120.00 699.08 600.85 71.25 3120.00
Seawall (0–1) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Percent seawalled (%) 39.59 17.79 0.00 61.54 42.49 21.00 0.00 100.00
House size (sq. ft.) 1784.05 811.17 700.00 5000.00 2571.56 2377.86 450.00 22000.00
Lot size (sq. ft.) 5843.64 5019.31 863.00 28239.00 8032.56 4873.24 399.00 28106.00
Years since last trans-
action
14.42 10.52 1.00 42.00 18.62 12.84 0.00 55.00
Years since built 40.09 19.86 2.00 109.00 44.78 20.56 1.00 104.00
Fireplace (0–1) 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Waterfront (0–1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Waterfront nourish-
ment (1–0)
0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
Beach nourishment 
(1–0)
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Bedroom 2.93 1.09 1.00 6.00 3.19 1.47 1.00 12.00
Geotime 2289.42 6609.13 0.47 45772.00 4895.74 8636.80 55.96 46059.00
Elevation (ft.) 7801.26 4220.72 −12.30 10158.70 1327.22 3360.50 − 18.00 10086.40
Distance to water (ft.) 186.75 162.45 1.00 803.35 249.77 161.57 29.05 670.38
Beach width 81.21 286.96 0.00 3000.00 38.39 179.09 0.00 2000.00
Built Post-FIRM 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Year of purchase 1985 10.52 1957 1998 1980 12.84 1944 1999
Observations 132 151
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this locational attribute should provide more insights on the effect of seawalls on 
inland property. In particular, seawalls in Santa Cruz should affect inland properties 
much more than they could in San Diego. The extent of seawalled properties are 
about the same for the two counties, which makes these two cases comparable.
3  Results
3.1  OLS results
We start our analysis with an ordinary least squares (OLS) method using all the vari-
ables listed in Table A.6. We did separate analysis for San Diego and Santa Cruz 
to account for  the potential difference in hedonic price functions between these 
two market segments. We also run combined observations from the two counties 
to formally test this difference by adding a San Diego indicator variable that turns 
on when the property is situated in San Diego County. Results are summarized in 
Table 2.
For San Diego, we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation for only 4 var-
iables. In particular, we find that price increases by about 0.50% as the size of a 
house increases by one percent.9 This translates to a marginal implicit price of house 
size by about $164/sq.ft.10 Lot size has smaller marginal implicit price, with houses 
being valued more by about $37 as lot size increases by sq.ft. Waterfront is surpris-
ingly not significant. This is possibly due to fact that most houses in San Diego are 
situated in high cliffs above water and beach is not easily accessible. Surprisingly, 
homeowners value having a fireplace in their homes, considering that most areas of 
San Diego rarely require a fireplace for heating. This is possibly because we did not 
explicitly know whether it is outdoor or indoor fireplaces. Outdoor fireplaces may be 
associated with homeowners’ valuation of outdoor living, which makes this struc-
tural attribute a worthy investment.11
In Santa Cruz, house size is positively correlated with housing prices. However, 
since houses in Santa Cruz are larger on the average, the implicit marginal price of 
house size is smaller at $135/sq.ft. The same observation holds true for lot size, with 
Santa Cruz houses being valued by $32 more per additional sq.ft. Waterfront, in 
contrast to San Diego, is significantly associated with higher housing prices in Santa 
Cruz. In particular, waterfront houses in Santa Cruz are valued more by about 40%, 
9 We recognize that all of our regression coefficients should be interpreted as elasticities, although we 
remain silent on the direction of causality. See Gopalakrishnan et al. (2011) for a discussion of the endo-
geneity problem in hedonic beach value models and for a potential solution.
10 We calculate marginal implicit price ($ per unit) for the logged variables as:
where k is the estimated coefficient of the regressor xk , and x̄k and p̄ are the unconditional means of the 
regressor xk and the dependent variable p, respectively.
Marginal Implicit Price =
𝛽k
x̄k
× p̄
11 The National Association of Realtors 2013 Home Features Survey reveals that 57% chose homes with 
at least one fireplace.
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posting a marginal implicit price of more than $232,000.12 The existence of fire-
place, while positive, is not significantly correlated with housing prices.
Overall, we find no strong evidence to suggest that there  are systematic differ-
ences in housing prices between the two counties or market segmentation (Taylor 
2003). Our OLS regression finds that the San Diego dummy, while positive, is statis-
tically insignificant. We also performed Wald test for San Diego dummy and found 
the F-statistic insignificant, with the value of 1.60 and p value equivalent to 0.207.
The variables indicating flooding and erosion risks (e.g.Geotime, Elevation) do 
not appear to be significantly correlated with property prices. This is true when we 
analyze housing prices in each county separately and after combining observations 
from the two counties. This is different from the findings in Kriesel and Friedman 
(2003). This could potentially be explained by the different nature of the shorelines 
between the two regions. Unlike the Atlantic and Gulf coast, much of the Pacific 
coastline consists of narrow beaches backed by steep cliffs. Cliff erosion is site spe-
cific and episodic, which is often hidden by the low long-term average erosion rate. 
Only 45 observations in our entire sample have a Geotime less than 100 years. It is 
likely that erosion risk is not reflected in property prices till decades later.
Although the low long-term erosion rate might reduce homeowners’ perceptions 
of the erosion threat to their properties, shoreline management policies can still 
affect house buyers’ awareness of erosion risk levels. Regarding the seawall indica-
tors, we obtain remarkably similar results to Kriesel and Friedman (2003) and Krie-
sel et al. (2005). The coefficient on Seawall is positive but not statistically significant 
in either county. The imprecision of this estimate relative to Kriesel and Friedman 
(2003) could be due to our smaller sample size. We evaluate the effect of seawalls 
on housing prices using combined samples to increase the sample size and observe 
same result.
Meanwhile, we notice a significant negative effect of Percent Seawalls on prop-
erty prices in Santa Cruz. This suggests that property owners in the county are worse 
off as a result of extensive coastal armoring. Furthermore, our coefficient of −0.11 is 
more than three times larger than the −0.03 found by Kriesel and Friedman (2002). 
This suggests that, as the percentage of waterfront coastal armoring in a community 
increases by 100%, the associated value of a house located on the Santa Cruz coast 
drops by $77,597. In contrast, we do not find any strong evidence to suggest that the 
extent of armored coastline in San Diego has an effect on property values. If there 
is an effect, house values in San Diego declines by about $22,365 if the share of 
waterfront coastal armoring in a community increases by 100%. Interestingly, our 
estimate falls within the ballpark of Kriesel and Friedman (2003) who found that for 
the same percentage increase in coastal armoring, house prices on the Atlantic and 
Gulf coasts drop by $41,091 in 2014 dollars.
12 For dummy variables, the calculated marginal implicit price is expressed as:
where k and p are as previously defined.
(5)Marginal Implicit Price = (e𝛽k − 1) × p̄
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To analyze the net effect of building a seawall from a point of view of a marginal 
house, we need to account for the joint effect of building a seawall in front of the 
property and the added armored coastline on housing prices. Figure 1 summarizes 
the results using estimates from Table 2.13 The solid green line reflects the change 
in the property value of the marginal household from building a seawall, given an 
assumed change in the share of armored waterfront properties in the county. In San 
Diego, even if a group of coastal households decides to build seawalls on their prop-
erties, bringing the share of armored properties to 80%, we will not find any statisti-
cally significant effect on their housing prices. In contrast, we find a significant drop 
in the value of a marginal house in Santa Cruz if building a seawall would result in 
an increase in armored waterfront properties by just about 9% (see vertical red line). 
The drop in the property resale values is about 1% and can go up to 10% if building 
seawalls would result in increasing the current share of protected waterfront proper-
ties from 42 to 84%.
We also ran two OLS models with a smaller subset of variables in order to omit 
variables that seemed unimportant and slightly  increase our sample size for Santa 
Cruz. The results of these reduced models are presented in columns 5 through 10 
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Fig. 1  Estimated percent change in housing prices relating to percent change in seawalled properties in 
San Diego and Santa Cruz counties. Source: Authors’ estimates
13 Calculation of the net effect of coastal armoring is given by:
Confidence intervals are calculated using delta method.
Net Effect = seawall × Seawall (0-1) + percent seawalled × Percent Seawalled
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in Table 2. The coefficients that are statistically significant in the reduced models 
are mostly consistent with those in the complete model. The coefficient on Seawall 
is still not statistically significant. The coefficient on Percent Seawalls is about the 
same level as shown in Table 2 for Santa Cruz but larger for San Diego and mar-
ginally significant when we remove variables relating to nearby and front beach 
nourishment.
We also consider the world as suggested by Parsons (1990) in which locational 
amenities are pure public goods and as a result the hedonic function must have 
such attributes weighted by lot size. He pointed that weighting would account for 
the opportunity cost imposed by landowners with larger properties on others within 
their neighborhood, thus avoiding bias in the marginal price of locational attributes. 
This setting is quite applicable to our analysis because the number of individuals 
that may enjoy the benefits of a beach of certain quality is limited by the area of land 
over which that amenity is available. For example, there is a fixed amount of land 
within a mile from the Natural Bridges State Beach in Santa Cruz. Thus, the more 
land is taken by one household in a nearby location, the less available to others the 
benefits associated with living nearby the beach. Parsons (1990) argues that the size 
of this opportunity cost imposed on others is proportional to the size of the lot occu-
pied by the landlord.
To account for the pure public good nature of location attributes, we modified 
Eq. (2) using the log-transformed price per unit of land as the dependent variable. 
This procedure is equivalent to a weighting rule suggested by Parsons (1990), which 
allows locational attribute prices to vary proportionally with the amount of land 
occupied. Results using this method are shown in rows 2–4 of Table A.7. The coef-
ficients of our variables of interest, namely Seawall and Percent Seawall, are com-
parable to the baseline result. We also formulate hedonic price regressions without 
the structural attributes similar to Diamond (1980) (see rows 5–7 of Table A.7). Our 
results remain robust and similar to the baseline results.
We first test the robustness of our estimates by running a median regression.14 
Contrary to simple OLS, median regression does not rely on strict assumptions in 
relation to the distribution of the residuals. This is particularly useful when our 
dependent variable (i.e. housing prices) is bimodal or multimodal and when the 
source multimodality is known.15 Results, as presented in A.11, show fairly similar 
to the baseline results.
Finally, we performed other regressions, such as specifying with years-since-last-
transaction dummies (instead of log-transformed continuous variable) and with the 
same sample size across different specifications.16 Regression results are presented 
in Tables A.9 and A.10. Our results remain stable and generally similar with the 
baseline estimates.
14 Due to the relatively small sample size, an anonymous referee suggested to run a median regression.
15 See Figure A.2 for the distribution of log-transformed housing prices for San Diego and Santa Cruz 
counties.
16 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for recommending these procedures to test the robustness of 
our baseline estimates.
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3.2  Accounting for spatial dependence
Testing for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in studying housing prices is 
important principally because the presence of spatial dependence violates one of the 
major properties of regression analysis—the independence across observations (Can 
1990). Ignoring spatial autocorrelation can lead to biased parameter estimates and 
misleading significance levels. In our context, if the prices of nearby houses have 
an absolute effect on each other, potentially due to the fact that some sellers or buy-
ers assess a given property not only based on location but also on prices of nearby 
houses, then we may need to add spatial autoregressive terms in our specification. 
Equation (2) becomes a model with N cross-section units for each i ∈ N as specified 
below:
with
where  is an nxn inverse distance weight matrix,  is a vector of the spatially 
lagged house prices and  and  are the unknown spatial lagged parameters.  is a 
vector of explanatory variables, including Seawall and Percent Seawall, and u is a 
standard i.i.d. error term.
We account for the presence of spatial autocorrelation as specified in alternative 
forms. In particular, we test for the following hypotheses: (1)  = 0,  ≠ 0 which leads 
to a spatial lag model (SLM);  ≠ 0,  = 0 leading to spatial errors model (SEM); and 
(3)  ≠ 0,  ≠ 0 leading to a spatial ARAR(1,1) model (Arraiz et al. 2010).
3.2.1  Tests for spatial dependence
A convenient and perhaps the most transparent way of testing for spatial depend-
ence is in terms of graphical representation. Figure 2 shows the Moran scatterplot 
of house prices for San Diego and Santa Cruz counties. Moran scatterplots show 
the relationship between the individual house’s price (in standardized form) in the 
(6)Pi =  + i + i
 =  + u,
Moran's I = 0.0226
P-value = 0.6850
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Fig. 2  Moran scatterplots for Housing Prices in San Diego and Santa Cruz counties Source of basic data: 
The Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and Management (Center 2000)
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horizontal axis and the average prices of neighboring houses weighted by the spatial 
lag vector  in the vertical axis. We assume that the degree of spatial dependence 
of a particular house is inversely related to the geographic distance between the two 
properties. That is,
We find evidence of positive spatial dependence for houses located in Santa Cruz. 
The Moran statistic is 0.0867 and is statistically significant at 5% level. In contrast, 
there is no strong evidence to suggest that housing prices in San Diego are spatially 
dependent.
We formally test for the presence of global spatial autocorrelation by calculating 
Moran’s I (Moran 1950) and Geary c (Cliff and Ord 1970). We then determine the 
significance of these statistics following the procedure suggested by Pisati (2001). 
Table 3 summarizes the results. The tests confirm our graphical approach suggest-
ing no strong spatial dependence of house prices in San Diego. In contrast, there is 
strong evidence of spatial autocorrelation of house prices in Santa Cruz. The spatial 
autocorrelation persists even if we combined the two datasets.
3.2.2  Hedonic prices with spatial dependence
With an indication of potential spatial dependence, we re-estimate Eq. (2) using data 
on Santa Cruz county house prices. This time, we relax the assumption that  and  
are both zero. We estimate parameters based on models with spatial dependence in 
a maximum likelihood framework using the procedure suggested by Drukker et al. 
(7)
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 w1,2 w1,3 … w1,n
w2,1 0 w2,3 … w2,n
w3,1 w3,2 0 … w3,n
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
wn,1 wn,2 wn,3 … 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
wi,j =
1
dij
.
Table 3  Tests for global spatial 
autocorrelation
The estimated standard deviation of each statistic are in parentheses. 
*,**,***Represents significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively
San Diego Santa Cruz Combined
Distance of nearest 
neighbor (in kms)
Mean 1.279 0.042
Min 0.931 0.006
Max 3.336 0.239
Moran’s I 0.023 0.087** 0.054*
(0.049) (0.037) (0.022)
Geary c 0.943 0.900** 0.924**
(0.051) (0.040) (0.024)
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(2015). We employ different specifications to potentially account for different forms 
of spatial autocorrelation, namely spatial lag model, spatial error model and the spa-
tial ARAR(1,1,) model.17 Then, for each model, we run three different specifications 
similar to the simple OLS regression in which we start with all the variables and 
drop some of them to slightly increase our sample. We do this to test the stability of 
our estimates. Results are presented in Table 4.
We start the analysis by looking at the estimated spatial autocorrelation param-
eters. We find no strong evidence to suggest that there exists spatial autocorrela-
tion. In particular, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that (1)  = 0,  ≠ 0 ; (2) 
 ≠ 0,  = 0 ; and (3)  ≠ 0,  ≠ 0 in Eq. (6).18
The estimated effect of changes in the variables of interest, even after account-
ing for potential spatial dependence, remains robust and consistent with our base-
line results. The coefficient remains insignificant for the indicator variable Seawall. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient for the extent of coastline armoring (Percent Seawalls), 
remains negative albeit slightly smaller and statistically significant. This confirms 
our earlier result that as the percentage of waterfront coastal armoring in a beach 
community increases, the associated value of houses located in San Diego and 
Santa Cruz drops significantly. Moreover, our estimates remain stable across differ-
ent forms of assumed spatial dependence and under different sets of controls, thus 
increasing our confidence on the robustness of the results.
4  Discussion
We find that the sales price of a house located within 1,000 feet of the coast in San 
Diego and Santa Cruz counties is correlated with its structural characteristics and 
the shoreline management policies taken in the community. Although seawalls pro-
tect coastal structures from erosion damages, the negative coefficient on Percent 
Seawalls calls for attention to the welfare impacts of coastal armoring on waterfront 
and non-waterfront households.
Using our baseline estimates, we predicted the potential  change in total hous-
ing values for the two counties when the share of those that are protected by sea-
walls increases by a certain percentage (see Table  5). Results suggest that dou-
bling the current level of properties protected by seawalls may be associated with 
a $20,954.16 drop in the resale value of an average coastal home in San Diego that 
is protected by seawalls. For those that are not protected by seawalls, the magnitude 
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee, we recognized that the estimation of a SARAR model may intro-
duce more problems than solving them. Nonetheless, the employment of different specifications, includ-
ing the SARAR, is meant to show that our estimates, particularly on seawall protection, are consistent 
and robust over different specifications of spatial dependence. We refrain to interpret the actual estimates 
due to uncertainties in the type of spatial dependence.
18 We also perform diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in an OLS framework after estimating 
Eq. (2), following the procedure as suggested by Pisati (2001). Results are summarized in Table A.8. We 
find no strong evidence to suggest that there is spatial dependence amongst observed housing prices in 
each county.
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is larger at $22,365. Overall, the said increase in the share of protected properties 
translates to more than $718 million reduction in the value of affected houses in 
the county. In terms of property tax revenues, a very crude back-of-the-envelope 
Table 5  Potential effect of increasing the share of waterfront households protected by seawalls
I. San Diego County has 70 miles of coastline. Based on a very conservative estimate of housing density 
(4 homes per acre), this means that there are approximately 33,939 homes within 1,000 feet of the shore-
line. 42% of these homes are currently protected by seawalls. Property tax in San Diego County is a little 
more than 1%.
II. Santa Cruz County has 29 miles of coastline. Based on an even more conservative estimate of housing 
density (2 homes per acre), this means that there are approximately 7,030 homes within 1,000 feet of the 
shoreline. 40% of these homes are currently protected by seawalls. Property tax in Santa Cruz County is 
a little more than 1%.
III. The change in price for seawalled properties is calculated using the estimated coefficients of the Sea-
wall and Percent Seawall in our baseline model (i.e., OLS including all variables). The unconditional 
mean property price for each county is used as the base price ($588,000 for San Diego and $699,000 for 
Santa Cruz.). For non-seawalled properties, we just used the coefficient for Percent Seawall
% Change in 
seawalls (from 
current mean)
Change in price No. of affected houses Total effect Revenue 
loss
(in $) (in $) Seawalled Non-seawalled (in ’000$) (in ’000$)
San Diego
1.00 10.47 −223.65 14,397 19,542 −4,219.92 −42.20
5.00 7.90 −1,118.26 14,967 18,972 −21,097.37 −210.97
10.00 −95.32 −2,236.53 15,680 18,259 −42,331.75 −423.32
20.00 −635.10 −4,473.06 17,105 16,834 −86,161.88 −861.62
30.00 −1,619.35 −6,709.58 18,531 15,408 −133,391.07 −1,333.91
40.00 −3,048.07 −8,946.11 19,956 13,983 −185,919.98 −1,859.20
50.00 −4,921.25 −11,182.64 21,382 12,557 −245,649.31 −2,456.49
60.00 −7,238.90 −13,419.17 22,807 11,132 −314,479.74 −3,144.80
70.00 −10,001.02 −15,655.70 24,232 9,707 −394,311.94 −3,943.12
80.00 −13,207.60 −17,892.22 25,658 8,281 −487,046.53 −4,870.47
90.00 −16,858.64 −20,128.75 27,083 6,856 −594,584.26 −5,945.84
100.00 −20,954.16 −22,365.28 28,509 5,430 −718,825.86 −7,188.26
Santa Cruz
1.00 −0.74 −775.98 2,840.12 4,189.88 −32,533.71 −325.34
5.00 −158.54 −3,879.89 2,952.60 4,077.40 −162,879.83 −1,628.80
10.00 −704.13 −7,759.79 3,093.20 3,936.80 −327,267.40 −3,272.67
20.00 −2,956.45 −15,519.58 3,374.40 3,655.60 −667,096.04 −6,670.96
30.00 −6,756.96 −23,279.37 3,655.60 3,374.40 −1,032,546.40 −10,325.46
40.00 −12,105.67 −31,039.15 3,936.80 3,093.20 −1,436,679.04 −14,366.79
50.00 −19,002.57 −38,798.94 4,218.00 2,812.00 −1,892,554.72 −18,925.55
60.00 −27,447.66 −46,558.73 4,499.20 2,530.80 −2,413,233.60 −24,132.34
70.00 −37,440.95 −54,318.52 4,780.40 2,249.60 −3,011,776.64 −30,117.77
80.00 −48,982.43 −62,078.30 5,061.60 1,968.40 −3,701,244.16 −37,012.44
90.00 −62,072.11 −69,838.09 5,342.80 1,687.20 −4,494,696.64 −44,946.97
100.00 −76,709.97 −77,597.88 5,624.00 1,406.00 −5,405,194.88 −54,051.95
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calculation suggests that this increase would cost the government $7 million in 
terms of revenue loss and the discounted present value of this annual loss is $143 
million.19
For Santa Cruz County, the potential effect of increasing the current share of 
seawalled properties by 100% is significantly greater, reaching to about a $77,000 
decline in home resale values for protected properties. For non-seawalled proper-
ties, the effect is about similar at $78,000. This implies that there is no positive net 
benefit of putting up an additional seawall from the current level. The increase in the 
seawalled-properties is associated with the loss in the total value of coastal homes in 
the county by more than $5.4 billion. This translates to a government revenue loss of 
about $54 million, which is equivalent to a discounted present value of about $1.08 
billion.
Although our estimates are large, the associated welfare impacts are consist-
ent with the existing literature. Our findings are in line with Kriesel and Friedman 
(2003) and Kriesel et al. (2005) who find negative, albeit smaller, effects on prop-
erty prices. Landry et  al. (2003) also found a negative effect, but their estimated 
effect was statistically insignificant. However, their contingent valuation study 
strongly suggests that beachgoers do not like beaches with seawalls. The existing 
literature suggests that our estimates might even be underestimated. Gopalakrishnan 
et  al. (2011) correct for endogeneity bias and find that the beach width effect on 
property prices is almost five times larger. Furthermore, they find that the long- term 
net value of coastal residential property can fall by as much as 52% when the erosion 
rate triples. To the extent that seawalls can potentially double or triple erosion rates 
on neighboring non-protected properties, our estimates are very much in line with 
their results.
Our paper does not come without limitations. Aside from potential measurement 
problems associated with the survey-based price variable and the inability to control 
for unobserved systematic patterns across beach communities, our study may also 
be confounded by the potential immunity of the property market to climate risks, 
which may be coupled with households’ potential downward bias against these risks. 
To be more precise, if property buyers underestimate the risk of floods/erosion, then 
the benefits of seawalls will be vastly undervalued while the negative consequences 
would remain. Moreover, we find that variables indicating flooding and erosion risks 
are not significantly correlated with property prices, which could indicate that home 
buyers are myopic. Another possibility is that home buyers assess the risk accurately 
but that it is quite low or even non-existent. Both possibilities could be because 
there were no flood episodes in the study areas in the years prior to the survey. Most 
of the prior flood episodes were in Northern California. There has been no major 
impacts in Central California until 2017 when Hurricane Marie caused flooding in 
the region.
Even in the absence of flooding and erosion, more recent information of pro-
gressing climate change, climate change reporting, and extreme events might have 
19 Property tax in San Diego County is a little more than 1%. Using the annual discount rate of 5%, an 
infinite stream of annual losses of $7.188 million would be $7.188 m/0.05 = $143.765 m.
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changed perspectives about coastal armoring in more recent years. Moreover, poten-
tial buyers may also shy away from purchasing properties with visible protection 
measures, which may compel homeowners to opt not to install coastal defense meas-
ures. How these issues influence property housing, along with the determination of 
the most cost-effective approach to deal with increasing sea level rise, are some of 
the areas which future research should explore.
There are also issues relating to the estimation of the potential effect of seawall 
protection on housing values while disentangling the effect of spatial dependence on 
the variable of interest.20 These issues include potential over-connectivity as argued 
by Smith (2009). Moreover, our house price variable is technically from different 
time periods, which implies that the weight matrix should limit the spatial relations 
among the transactions (Dubé et al. 2016). Thus, the spatial relations in our models 
necessarily assume that dependence is purely cross-sectional. While we recognize 
these estimation issues, determining their implications on the estimated parameters 
is beyond the scope of this study.
Despite the above methodological concerns, our paper represents a step forward 
in terms of measuring a previously unmeasured social cost (in California). Further-
more, the correlation with house prices is only one of the many ways that seawalls 
might impose social costs and benefits. Recreational and existence values of beaches 
are also clearly important. Our paper finds that properties near beaches with signifi-
cant seawall protection are selling for lower prices than those without. This informa-
tion is easily observed, collected, and defensible. Even though we are still missing 
many of the social costs associated with seawalls, our hedonic estimates and implied 
welfare costs are so large that this raises serious questions about whether seawalls in 
California pass a simple cost-benefit analysis. The benefits to individual waterfront 
property owners would have to be extremely large to justify the social costs.
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